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MR. VISCO: This is an interview with 
Mr. Clayton J. Thomas under the auspices 
of the Oral History Project of the Military 
Operations Research Society (MORS). The 
MORS Oral History Project is documenting 
the origins and early experiences of mili-
tary operations research in the United 
States. 
Today is the 29th of December 1998. 
The interview is being conducted in the 
office of Mr. Thomas, temporarily located 
at 1777 Kent Street, Rosslyn, Arlington, Vir-
ginia. The temporary location results from 
the renovation of the Pentagon building 
where Mr. Thomas is normally located. 
My name is Gene Visco. Participating 
with me in the interview of Mr. Thomas is 
Dr. Robert S. Sheldon, MORS president-
elect 1998-1999. 
Clay, if you want to start off saying 
who are you and what is your job title, and 
that sort of background stuff. 
MR. THOMAS: My name is Clay 
Thomas. I am the chief scientist, officially, I 
think it is senior scientist, but we call it 
chief scientist, of the Air Force Studies and 
Analyses Agency. I have a Pentagon ad-
dress, Headquarters, USAF, 1570 Air Force 
Pentagon in Washington, D.C. 20330. My 
phone number now is (703) 588-6944. My 
E-mailaddressisdayton.thomas@pentagon. 
af.mil, which indicates my Air Force affili-
ation. 
You asked about my background. I was 
born, raised, and educated in St. Joseph, 
Missouri. I attended kindergarten through 
Grades 12, and then two years of junior 
college, (Grades 13 and 14). Then I won a 
scholarship to the University of Chicago in 
1940, attended Chicago for a couple of 
years, majored in math, minored in phys-
ics, got a Bachelor's in '42. 
In the spring of '42, I enlisted in the 
Army Air Force, (not the Air Corps, but by 
that time the Army Air Force), became a 
cadet for nine months, and upon gradua-
tion was commissioned as a second lieuten-
ant in the Army Air Force. I was in the 
Army Air Force as a weather officer from 
'42 through the fall of '45. 
MR. VISCO: How did you happen to 
take mathematics and physics? Was there 
something that led you to the sciences: fam-
ily, or your predilections? 
MR. THOMAS: Yes. My parents had 
considerable influence on me although they 
had very little formal education. My father 
had about six years of schooling in a Ger-
man-speaking community in Kansas. He 
knew no English until he was about six and 
went to school. 
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My mother also grew up in Kansas. She 
graduated from high school, and she 
taught school in a nearby community in 
Nebraska for a year or so, and she went 
about one year, I think it was, to a business 
college. 
They were both quite intelligent. My 
father was very sharp, very careful, was a 
stickler for accuracy, and had keen appre-
ciation for cause and effect relationships. 
My mother learned to read when she was 
about three, read voluminously, had a 
great deal of general knowledge. She had 
been very good in math and in that area I 
inherited great genes, and I found mathe-
matics to be a fascinating subject, but I 
liked most subjects. 
DR. SHELDON: That scholarship to 
Chicago, how did you happen to win that? 
MR. THOMAS: We had to take a writ-
ten test, and I was pretty good at taking 
tests, leveraging a little bit of knowledge to 
make better-than-average guesses on mul-
tiple choice questions. 
After the war, I went back to the Uni-
versity of Chicago in January of '46. I got 
my Master's in math in '47, and continued 
taking graduate math courses, I had all my 
courses required for a Ph.D. plus language 
exams. 
Then, I started working part time on a 
project at the University of Chicago. There 
was some talk about having classified dis-
sertations, but that never materialized, so I 
never got a Ph.D. (though the older I be-
came more and more called me "doctor"). 
MR. VISCO: You are one of those 
ABD's. 
MR. THOMAS: Right. 
Some of my experiences while growing 
up led me into OR type activities. I had 
always been fascinated by measuring de-
vices, e.g. carpenters rulers. I asked for and 
received a stopwatch as a present. 
I felt that sports, for example track and 
field, had many aspects where scientific ap-
proach could be of value. I measured off 
the alley behind our house, 201 yards long, 
used to organize races there, and specu-
lated with some of my friends how one 
could apply science to various sports in-
cluding baseball. Also, when we took fam-
ily trips, I recorded our progress, so I could 
try to relate our average speed to several 
variables. 
MR. VISCO: I oftentimes time aircraft 
takeoffs from the time the engines rev up 
until the time the wheels lift off. The aver-
age is 20 seconds. 
MR. THOMAS: I felt that my work in 
studying meteorology and trying to fore-
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area which has all ldnds of mathematical or 
scientific trappings, but where there is a great 
deal of art involved in actual forecasting, which 
was a very imperfect profession in those days 
(and still far from perfect). In the same vein I 
found useful examples in two fascinating but 
non-rigorous books that I read once I was out of 
the 8th grade and had a card to the upstairs 
part of the St. Joseph library-Calculus for the 
Practical Man and Statistics for Students of Psy-
chology and Education. 
My first formal involvement in military op-
erations research came when I started worldng 
part time in a project at the University of Chi-
cago in 1947. It was called Project CHORE. The 
meaning of that, at the time, was classified Se-
cret. Now that it is completely unclassified, I 
can tell you that "CHORE" meant Chicago 
Ordnance Research. It was sponsored jointly by 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Later the Air 
Force became the sole sponsor and renamed 
CHORE as the Institute for Air Weapons Re-
search, IA WR. 
Our task was, as the names implied, to 
study ordnance and its impact on one-on-one 
air combat. Later, we got into a little bit of a 
campaign analysis, but not very sophisticated, 
where we used Lanchester equations, zero-sum 
two-person game theory, etc. 
DR. SHELDON: Were there members of 
the faculty involved or was that a post-doc? 
MR. THOMAS: Yes. The dean of the Di-
vision of Physical Sciences, Dr. Walter Bartky, 
was the director. For a while we had an assis-
tant director, Dr. Ed Hewett, who was a math-
ematics professor specializing in topology. He 
had been an operations researcher in World 
War II, had flown on half a dozen bomber 
missions, and his expertise was aerial gunnery. 
He taught courses to aerial gunners in rules for 
aiming in combat, often non-intuitive to those 
with hunting experience. 
We had an associate director, who was a 
retired Army lieutenant colonel who lost a leg 
in a C-54 accident in Alaska. He thought the 
sun rose and set at Wright Patterson Air Force 
Base. 
DR. SHELDON: Do you remember that 
Army colonel's name? 
MR. THOMAS: Yes, Paul Shanahan. He 
was quite knowledgeable about operations, 
and that was useful. 
However, the first time I was ever involved 
in an Air Force study where the client indicated 
what he thought the answer should be, came 
back when I was base weather officer at Laugh-
lin Field (now AFB) in Del Rio, Texas. One 
afternoon, Major A very came striding into the 
weather station. He said, Captain Thomas, "I 
need your help, I want to get out of this dog-
gone PT (physical training) in 100-plus-degree 
temperatures." He said he had heard that the 
same isotherm goes through both Del Rio and 
Death Valley, and he wanted me to do a study 
that would get us out of PT. 
Well, I told him we would find out what 
the facts were. He was right about the isotherm. 
I wrote that up, but we didn't get out of PT. As 
a matter of fact, I was coming out of PT one 
afternoon when we heard about the death of 
Franklin Roosevelt. 
Getting back to our project in Chicago, we 
were concerned about aircraft vulnerability and 
what the impact would be in interceptor versus 
bomber combat, etc. Since we were concerned 
with future aircraft, we didn't have any combat 
data, so we couldn't apply the same methods 
that had been used so effectively in World War 
IL We resorted to the theory of games to incor-
porate the effect of the times of fire; when one 
fired early he was more likely to be alive, but if 
firing later ranges would be less and if still alive 
his guns should have more effect. Using game 
theory we developed a lot of formulas for op-
timal firing times. That was exciting work. 
DR. SHELDON: The aircraft vulnerability 
you were estimating, was it the vulnerability of 
the bombers or the interceptors or both? 
MR. THOMAS: It was both. And the 
search for data and methodology led to several 
trips. We were going to evaluate the effective-
ness of the B-52 versus Soviet interceptors. Of 
course, we were also interested in U.S. intercep-
tors versus Soviet aircraft. We had a study in-
volving that which came out in 2 May 1949. 
I remember the first trip I was on. Several 
of us went to Wright Patterson Air Force Base, 
and we were briefed on the futuristic B-52, 
which had not yet come into service. We had 
briefings on the B-47, which had come in ser-
vice, and a few other aircraft. That was in the 
fall of 1947. 
In January of '48, two of us went to Aber-
deen Proving Ground to find out about their 
program on vulnerability. They had a bunch of 
aircraft at which they fired different ordnance 
under a variety of conditions, and estimated 
what the effect of the damage would be on 
aircraft ability to fly. We tapped into the exper-
tise of Herbert Weiss and Art Stein who 
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worked for Herb at Aberdeen. Both of them 
had considerable OR experience, which was 
very useful to us. 
In December of 1948, 50 years ago, I made 
my first visit to RAND and talked to many of 
their experts on the theory of games, and got 
several documents. We were using the theory 
of games to find optimal firing times for esti-
mating the probabilities of kill needed for the 
study due in 1949. 
Later on, we also did studies on the 
tradeoff in designing a bomber between put-
ting weights into turrets and guns as opposed 
to weights we devoted to bomber protection. 
We also did a short study on evaluating the 
wisdom of the Soviets in going to a more rapid 
firing gun that had been displayed in one of 
their May Day celebrations. 
DR. SHELDON: I have a question on your 
study of turrets and guns, armament versus 
protection. Do you remember any insights that 
you provided to decision-makers from that 
study? 
MR. THOMAS: Yes, we showed them 
tradeoff curves and some diagrams for allocat-
ing different amounts of weight. 
As a different kind of effort, we partici-
pated in an air defense exercise in 1951, cen-
tered at Hamilton Field north of San Francisco. 
It was one of the key installations. Later we 
were involved in analyzing combat between 
our interceptors and Soviet interceptors used 
by the Chinese pilots. We had gun camera film 
and got some additional information from 
"supplemental combat information reports" or 
SCIR's. There was quite a bit of methodology 
development in those days, and that was one of 
the interesting motivations. 
DR. SHELDON: What did you learn from 
looking at the combat films from Korea? Did 
you watch several of those? 
MR. THOMAS: Yes. We got some insight 
into the ranges of firing and their varying com-
bat effectiveness. There was also some air-to-
ground film. The Germans had done some 
work using combat film in World War II and 
that was also useful. 
I guess the first time I came across the term 
operations research was in reading Morse and 
Kimball, but the spirit of it was right down my 
alley. 
DR. SHELDON: When did you first read 
Morse and Kimball? 
MR. THOMAS: It was around 1950, I 
guess, thereabouts .. 
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DR. SHELDON: Was that an unclassified 
or still classified version then? 
MR. THOMAS: Still classified although 
there was a volume that Wald had written on 
the analysis that had been classified during the 
war, and one of our security advisers thought it 
still was, but I told him there was a declassified 
version in the Eckhart mathematics library on 
the campus at the University of Chicago. 
DR. SHELDON: That was a text by Wald? 
MR. VISCO: He had worked at one of the 
Army Air Force's Operations Analysis Sections, 
but as a younger man, wrote some textbooks 
afterwards. 
DR. SHELDON: When you worked with 
Ed Hewett and others in Chicago, did they 
relate any of their World War II operations 
research experiences, bring it to the studies? 
MR. THOMAS: To a certain limited ex-
tent. Walter Bartky was very expert in applied 
mathematics and statistics. As a matter of fact, 
he had done some early work on quality con-
trol, that he had not published, and didn't get 
much credit for it, but he was one of the very 
early pioneers. Later he became a vice presi-
dent, University of Chicago. He was also a 
friend of the Northrups, which was useful. 
We encountered a lot of the pioneers. I 
mentioned Herb Weiss and Art Stein at Aber-
deen. At RAND, there were game theorists 
Lloyd Shapley (son of the astronomer), Ed 
Quade, Mel Dresher, Sam Karlin, John Wil-
liams, and a whole host of others. 
At Project CHORE, there were a few divi-
sion chiefs who had been involved in World 
War II analysis, Tom Caywood who was later 
an editor of the Operations Research Journal, 
Bob Porter, and Frank Bothwell. Jay Gacinto) 
Steinhardt at OEG, which later became CNA, 
was an advisor of CHORE. There were many 
Army experts that had prior experience like 
Ellis Johnson, and some had been involved in 
World War II analysis for the Army Air Force. 
At CHORE we were fortunate in having 
Dr. Bartky who had a lot of applied math ex-
perience, and had learned many tricks of the 
trade in mathematics. For example, one of his 
papers first introduced me to generating func-
tions that have been very useful tools in statis-
tics and probability. 
MR. VISCO: Did Bartky have some World 
War II experience in OR that you know of? 
MR. THOMAS: I am not sure how much 
experience he had. He may have been involved 
in some of the mathematical aspects. 
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I think one of the important things about 
our early work was that we wrestled with the 
problems of going to systems analysis as a gen-
eralization of operations research, because we 
were dealing with future combat systems 
where we had no actual data yet, so we had to 
use analogies, relevant data, relevant exercises, 
tests, extrapolations, but there was inherently 
less certainty about it. Then, there was not op-
erations research work where you had some 
actual data for the real systems. That was prob-
ably particularly true of human performance. 
I had not heard the term systems analysis 
when doing some of the early work at Chicago. 
I recall one time I was so concerned about the 
limitations that I spent most of one night writ-
ing a little credo of what I believed about what 
we were doing and how accurate or inaccurate 
it might tum out to be, and later I discovered 
that RAND had been bothered by the same 
thing that had troubled us, and had coined the 
term systems analysis. 
DR. SHELDON: How did you convey un-
certainty to the decision-makers, the people 
you were doing work for? 
MR. THOMAS: We indicated what factors 
we had (and had not) considered, and we ad-
dressed the concerns that varied from individ-
ual to individual. 
Some of the officers that we had briefed 
were aware of the many peculiar characteristics 
of World War II systems; e.g. there were some 
airplanes that turned left better than they 
turned right, and some officers asked if we had 
taken that kind of thing into account, and we 
indicated whether we had or had not, and 
whether we thought it was very relevant to 
results. 
MR. VISCO: In some of those early stud-
ies, were you able to see the results, the imple-
mentation of recommendations or outputs of 
the study, were you ever aware of something 
actually being done as a result of one or the 
other of the studies? 
MR. THOMAS: I think our work had 
some impact on allocation of effort. I don't 
know how well we got results that would serve 
as predictors. Some of the major benefits of the 
work was in formulas we had devised that 
became rather standard. Other people had ei-
ther come across them in reports or derived 
them independently. 
A lot of what we did was spreadsheet anal-
ysis, using classical spreadsheets. At one time I 
supervised about half a dozen girls who oper-
ated desktop calculators-Fridens, Marchands, 
Monroes. I don't think the game theory appli-
cations ever came into general usage but there 
has been a modest amount of use. 
MR. VISCO: Some of the early ORO work, 
about the same time that you were doing some 
of this in Chicago, was attempting to relate 
game theory to operational gaming to see what 
kind of a link there was because the idea was 
that operational gaming was limited to one-
time kinds of events. The idea was to see 
whether or not you could use game theory to 
sort of generalize from operational gaming, but 
that never got very far either. 
MR. THOMAS: That came a little bit later. 
There was great enthusiasm for operational 
gaming in the late '50s and early '60s both at 
ORO and at RAND. Walt Deemer, who was the 
one who brought me to the Pentagon in Air 
Force Operations Analysis Office, was con-
cerned about the validity of some of the con-
clusions people drew from gaming. He and I 
together wrote a paper which won the Lanches-
ter prize on evaluating The Role of Operational 
Gaming in Operations Research. That was in the 
late fifties, around '58, I believe. 
MR. VISCO: Zimmerman's paper on 
Monte Carlo, the use of Monte Carlo processes 
for combat simulation was the prizewinner in 
'56, and that was for the same general arena 
because everyone was suggesting how one 
would use the digital computer to supplement 
both closed form analysis and operational gam-
ing. 
MR. THOMAS: Our conclusion was that 
gaming was very useful in getting a feel for a 
subject, in developing some intuition, coming 
up with conjectures as to what might be true, 
but it would take something more like game 
theory to establish the optimality of strategies. 
Also, among the pioneers were many active 
in professional societies. In the meetings of the 
first five years of ORSA (Operations Research 
Society of America) there was always a panel 
discussing what the definition of operations 
research (OR) should be, and there would be 
another panel asking if it was really possible to 
train people to do OR, and by training, they 
had in mind continuing the team approach 
which had been used in World War II. 
We (the Air Force) had people of various 
disciplines on teams, even lawyers and people 
like Larry Starkey whose major was in English, 
but they all did good work, as well of course as 
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the physicists, chemists, mathematicians, and 
engineers of all persuasions. 
Of course, the general definitions of opera-
tions research in those days usually empha-
sized its important basis in the scientific 
method like the established sciences, and there 
was quite a bit of influence of the scientific 
approach in the early days. 
There was really a thrill, I think, and excite-
ment in applying scientific method in areas 
where it had not yet been much used in getting 
results. 
DR. SHELDON: Can you give me an ex-
ample of where you applied the scientific 
method where it hadn't been applied before 
early on? 
MR. THOMAS: Of course, World War II 
operations research and our extensions in do-
ing systems analysis, involved areas that had 
had very little prior use of the scientific 
method. There had been some war gaming in 
World War I. Thomas Edison had done some, 
and there has been some gaming done by some 
of the people who later went to ORO, that 
anticipated some of the Pacific campaigns. It 
had been useful in developing intuition. 
MR. VISCO: One anecdote about that. El-
lis Johnson was at Pearl Harbor in the early part 
of December 1941. He was there to carry out 
some degaussing experiments for some of the 
Navy ships, so he was there when the raid took 
place. 
That weekend, his team back in the States, 
back at the old Naval Ordnance Lab, had been 
doing a game on a Japanese minelaying attack 
of Pearl Harbor, the Japanese coming in and 
laying sea mines in the harbor to tie it up, and 
that occurred the same weekend that the bomb-
ing raid occurred. 
MR. THOMAS: At an ORSA meeting in 
Pasadena, I gave a paper on some of our con-
clusions about the role of gaming, and Ellis 
Johnson was in the audience. I guess he 
thought we were a little harsh. I think he was a 
bit hurt by what we said, and we felt that 
gaming has a very useful role, but Nick Smith 
at ORO had written that gaming was a method 
of solving games, and we felt that it was very 
limited in that respect. Nick Smith had been an 
Air Force analyst in World War II in very useful 
studies of interdiction. 
On your checklist you asked about the im-
pact of common sense. It was very useful in 
checking the results of models, especially when 
one had any experience on that weapon system 
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design and development. I think there had been 
a loss of that to some extent with the onset of 
computer programming, complicated, detailed 
simulation models. 
Many people became big on simulation re-
sults as being more definitive than, in fact, they 
are, and some de-emphasis of appreciation of 
the importance of the analyst in exercising com-
mon sense and intuition resulted. 
DR. SHELDON: Were many of the ana-
lysts that you worked with back then what we 
call subject matter experts, now SMEs, with 
combat operational background on the OR 
teams? 
MR. THOMAS: There were some who 
had experience that was applicable, and that 
was very useful, and the few who had had OR 
experience in World War Il who stayed on were 
very useful in educating their successors. 
It was really in the fifties, I think, that peo-
ple began to look on OR as a profession. ORSA 
was founded about '52, the Military Operations 
Research Society, MORS, in '57, and the first 
few ORSA presidents all had had World War II 
experience, and that showed, of course, in these 
panel discussions, on definitions and discus-
sions of training. 
The interest in professional societies was 
partly motivated by academicians who had 
worked in World War II OR, and came back to 
their academic specialties, but they had not 
published a great deal in their pure subject 
matter, but had published important papers in 
applications of operations research. The new 
societies gave them an opportunity to be recog-
nized, as well as the value in passing on that 
knowledge to others, in an exchange of infor-
mation in societies and their publications, and 
there is still a valuable opportunity for profes-
sional societies today, but the public places 
more of an emphasis on some of the techniques 
at the expense of the applications. 
It was interesting to see how military OR 
groups were organized. It was partly by subject 
matter, partly by the techniques and methodol-
ogy that would be exercised by a subgroup of 
the group and partly to meet administrative or 
liaison type needs. 
In the Air Force Operations Analysis Office, 
where I went in 1955, to work for Walt Deemer, 
Roy Brothers was the Assistant for Operations 
Analysis with two-star equivalent rank. We 
had five divisions that were called teams in 
those days. Two of them were organized, in a 
sense, to fit new techniques. 
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One was based on atomic energy, and one 
was based on guided missiles, new weapon 
technologies. One of the groups, the one closest 
to classical OR, was the Combat Operations 
Team headed by Hugh Miser, that was in-
volved in analyzing exercises. 
We had a planning analysis team that I was 
on, headed by Walt Deemer to support the Air 
Force headquarters staff people working on fu-
ture combat forces by making studies of future 
weapon systems and their impact on our rela-
tive military potential. 
Our fifth team was a liaison team. There 
was an Air Force Regulation 20-7, which gov-
erned the development of operations analysis. 
If one of our major commands wanted a new 
operations analysis office, they went through 
the procedures outlined in AFR 20-7, and sim-
ilarly if they wanted to disband the group. That 
rarely happened. The Liaison team helped with 
the implementation of AFR 20-7. 
MR. VISCO: Was there much interaction 
between the planning analysis group and the 
combat operations group? 
MR. THOMAS: Yes, there was consider-
able interaction. Exercise results served as a 
guide to what future systems might be capable 
of, and as a matter of fact, there was quite a bit 
of interaction for the same reason among the 
dozen or so offices that existed under 20-7. 
We had meetings about twice a year, tech-
nical seminars, usually held at an Air Force 
base, and there was a lot of exchange of infor-
mation, and that was very valuable. 
MR. VISCO: At those exchanges, did you 
work with some of your Army and Navy coun-
terparts there or was that still primarily Air 
Force? 
MR. THOMAS: That was primarily Air 
Force, but after MORS was founded in 1957, it 
provided a forum for joint participation. 
In 1971, the Air Force OA Office was 
merged into a large office, the Air Force Studies 
and Analyses Office, and AFR 20-7 gradually 
fell into disuse. There were bilateral arrange-
ments, but fewer Air Force exchanges of the 
kind that the technical seminars had provided. 
It was partly, I suppose, because MORS was 
developing in those days and provided an av-
enue for joint participation of Army, Navy, Air 
Force. 
The impact of some of the early arrange-
ments was probably more to serve as examples 
and to provide the initial condition for the de-
velopment of later groups, but there were quite 
a few changes. 
I think some of the excitement was proba-
bly lost in the days when there was less pio-
neering required than in the earlier days, al-
though anyone who was newly becoming 
acquainted with operations research would still 
find that excitement up here. 
Of course, in those days, there were various 
sources of funding. Project CHORE had been 
funded by the three services initially, and later 
it became solely Air Force sponsored and 
funded by the early fifties. The Air Force oper-
ations analysis offices were funded by the nor-
mal air staff procedures for budgeting and 
funding. 
Other assets required things like data 
sources, and they required suitable clearance 
for access to databases. There was considerable 
interchange among analysis groups, one group 
learning from another, taking advantage of 
sites where experience had been gained al-
ready. 
There is considerable support of analysis 
groups as long as there is still a tie to the initial 
sponsor. Sometimes, as time went by, those ties 
may be eroded and sponsorship might be less 
enthusiastic in coming. 
As long as the groups were considered 
valuable by someone who can control funds, 
there was pretty adequate funding. So, one can 
see that some consideration of the needs of high 
level management is very important. If an op-
erations research group evolved to meet the 
needs at the time, it was likely to be funded at 
least for some time. If its usefulness gradually 
disappeared, then the group might go out of 
existence, and, of course, operations research 
groups in industry had some of the same ef-
fects. 
DR. SHELDON: How did you see the op-
erations research groups evolve from, say, the 
Korean War to the Cold War in between there 
and the Vietnam War? Did you see an evolu-
tionary process or a change in emphasis, fund-
ing sources, and methodologies? 
MR. THOMAS: I think the biggest change 
during those years was in methodology. As I 
said earlier, many people became infatuated 
with simulation, attributed to it over-estimated 
reliability, and there was some neglect of fun-
damentals. 
Some of the early methods made use of 
observation measurement and experiment to 
good advantage, and there is a very good paper 
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by Omand Solandt entitled Operation, Experi-
ment, and Measurement in Operations Research. 
The early calculating powers of the first 
electronic computers were quite limited. When 
I was in CHORE in Chicago we sent some 
analysts to the ENIAC to calculate some pseu-
do-random numbers that were useful in some 
of our work but the power of the ENIAC at that 
time was no greater than what we can now 
carry on our wrists. 
I think the influence of the early techniques 
on later techniques was probably strongest in 
the area of systems analysis for the same reason 
the systems analysis developed initially. 
When you didn't have that kind of data 
that you get from recording the results of actual 
operations, you have to resort to other devices, 
experiments, tests, conjecture, extrapolation, 
operational results, so that the systems analysis 
is still valuable today. 
We still have many of the same limitations, 
which are perhaps strongest in the area of hu-
man behavior and human performance al-
though now, of course, we have distributed 
interactive simulation, which allows one to get 
some human inputs there. It is not clear how 
similar human behavior in DIS is to behavior in 
actual combat, but probably closer than conjec-
ture is. 
Some of the techniques that have come into 
existence may be valuable in getting some use-
ful experiments. A lot of the early institution-
alization of OR groups involved those that had 
been doing experimental work either in World 
War II or in prior quantitative work. Lots of 
post-war analysis groups had evolved from 
World War II groups, some of the early institu-
tionalized groups. We had examples, such as 
the Army group at Aberdeen Proving Ground, 
Maryland, the Navy's Operations Evaluation 
Group, OEG, that evolved from some of the 
ASW work in World War II, and the Air Force 
operations analysis group in Air Force head-
quarters that had analysts who had been in 
World War II analysis groups in the field. Some 
who had been involved in World War II anal-
ysis came to Wright Patterson Air Force Base 
and were working after the war in some of the 
laboratories there. 
MR. VISCO: Were the early folks at 
RAND from the same kind of backgrounds? 
Since RAND was formed in '47, or there-
abouts-I can't recall who the early people-
MR. THOMAS: I think that more of the 
people at RAND came from academic sources 
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after evolution from the original Douglas Air-
craft group. There was some sprinkling of, 
quote, "practical," unquote experience. 
MR. VISCO: That was my impression 
also. 
MR. THOMAS: But RAND, I think was 
good at establishing contact with the people 
who were operating modem equipment and 
picking their brains, and, of course, there were 
groups in a lot of the aircraft companies, some 
of the companies that worked on electronics, 
and so they all had pretty good OR groups. 
One of the early contracts, one of the very 
few early contracts that the Air Force Opera-
tions Analysis Office had, was with Northrup, 
and by that time, Herb Weiss had left Aberdeen 
and was no longer working for the govern-
ment, and he had a group at Northrup. In such 
groups there was difference in approach from 
one analyst to another, and some difference 
from one agency to another. 
I recall that in Project CHORE, I had a chain 
of inequalities involving five analysts where 
Analyst A was more theoretical and less prac-
tical than Analyst B, Analyst B had the same 
relationship to Analyst C, etc. Each of the five, 
however, was doing valuable work and was 
really used appropriately, to take advantage of 
his obvious strengths of one kind or another. 
I recall that Les Dubins, who was co-author 
of a paper with Jimmy Savage, entitled How to 
Gamble if you Must, a valuable analysis of gam-
bling, would often come into the room and start 
a discussion by going to the blackboard and 
saying suppose we have a space X, a Borel field 
B, and a measure mu. 
MR. VISCO: What was his name again? 
MR. THOMAS: Les Dubins. I recall one 
day I brought my daughter to work, and Char-
ley Price, whose Ph.D., I think, was in algebra, 
came into my office, and started talking about 
some math problem, filling the blackboard with 
equations. 
My daughter was very discreet, and waited 
until he left, to say, "Dad, is he allowed to 
fritter away his time in mathematics?" I had 
always thought that mathematics was quite 
useful. 
My early trips, as I think I indicated, were 
motivated by the desire to pick the brains of 
some other organization, including the January 
'48 trip to Aberdeen, and the December '48 trip 
to RAND, where I touched base with some of 
their game theorists. Of course, general rela-
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tionships of organizations, one learning from 
another, led to many trips. 
DR. SHELDON: Did you take any of your 
OR skills to the combat theaters in Korea or 
Vietnam to do some analysis? 
MR. THOMAS: Yes, our Chicago group 
sent some analysts to Korea, and the Air Force 
operations analysis office sent some to both 
Korea and Vietnam. 
DR. SHELDON: What kinds of things did 
they study in the Korean theater? 
MR. THOMAS: They studied much the 
same thing that had been done in World War II 
(radar effectiveness, interdiction operations, 
fuse settings, etc.). As a matter of fact, there was 
a rediscovery of things that had been lost, 
things that had been known from analysis from 
World War II, and then rediscovered in Korea, 
and then later sometimes in Vietnam. 
MR. VISCO: The Air Force, during the 
Korean War, did they organize elements the 
way they had organized them in World War II, 
that is, analysts directly in support of a unit of 
the Air Forces? I recall there were groups with 
various bomber commands during the war, but 
I don't recall anything like that in Korea. Do 
you? 
MR. THOMAS: There was some analysis 
at that time, mostly done by some of those that 
had some World War II experience or knew of 
it more intimately, but some of the gun camera 
film analysis was actually done in Project 
CHORE back in Chicago. 
MR. VISCO: In comparison with the 
ground operations: before the Korean War was 
over, over 50 percent of the analysts at ORO 
had actually served in Korea. ORO at that time 
had about a hundred people, but still that is a 
lot of analysts who spent time in Korea during 
the war. 
MR. THOMAS: Well, Roy Brothers, head 
of Air Force OA, was quite impressed by the 
difficulty of getting analysts to go to Korea. 
Many of them didn't see it as terribly important 
relative to World War II. 
As a matter of fact, there was more interest 
that surfaced in 1957, after the Korean armistice 
had been signed, long past that, when the Sput-
nik went up. I remember getting a phone call in 
1957 from Dave Votaw who had been a World 
War II analyst, and he said, "Do you think I 
should come back to work?" Very little of that 
happened in Korea. So, what Roy Brothers had 
done because of his Korean difficulties was to 
establish four standby units at different univer-
sities: one in North Carolina, one at Iowa State, 
one at University of Pennsylvania, and one at 
the University of Denver. 
His concept had been that each of those 
constituted a team, composed of analysts of 
different disciplines, that would become famil-
iar with what was going on nowadays or "the-
nadays" in operations research, and in event of 
war could be sent to the theater. However, the 
teams never were used as he had visualized. 
They were useful in reviewing papers, referee-
ing journals, sometimes doing a bit of theoret-
ical work, but they were never actually brought 
to bear in Vietnam or any other combat area. 
I have indicated what some of the key in-
stitutions were in the early days and how they 
interacted. I don't know that there was a great 
deal of impact on later work I don't know that 
the differences between agencies had too much 
impact on the work. I think there was probably 
more impact that depended on the leaders to 
whom an OR agency reported. If the agency 
reported to somebody who appreciated the role 
of operations research, and if the leaders found 
the results of the agency useful, it could be a 
very fruitful relationship. However, if there 
was rotation and a new general officer came in, 
and he was not aware of the value of analysis, 
and if the operations research group was not 
good at communicating the value to the lead-
ers, then, there might be relatively little use 
made of that group or it might be actually 
serving other staff agencies to some extent. 
MR. VISCO: Do you have any examples 
from your early days in MORS, in its early days 
of learning some institutional differences be-
tween Army, Air Force, and Navy analysis? 
MR. THOMAS: Well, I don't know that I 
learned so much from MORS. There were some 
differences that I noticed while still at Chicago 
before MORS had been founded, and I saw that 
many of the differences depended on the lead-
ership of the groups. 
The OEG, I think, continued to be more 
devoted to theory than the Air Force lead office 
was in the early days, the lead office being 
more devoted to experience, experiment, exer-
cises, and so on. However OEG did have one 
valuable practice; it sent different analysts out 
to the fleet, so they had hands-on experience 
with actual operations. That was something 
that other groups could emulate. 
MR. VISCO: Clay, do you have any feel-
ing about was it better in the early days than it 
is now? Clearly, it is different. Organizations 
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have changed considerably from the forties and 
fifties, but can you reach any kind of value 
judgment as to quality of work, ease of working 
with people, making more of an impact, just 
some general observations about then and now 
kind of thing? 
MR. THOMAS: I think that to a large ex-
tent there is more specialization now. Many 
people in operations research offices have be-
come very expert on some simulation program, 
a good deal of their time has gone to involve-
ment in studies that use that computer pro-
gram. Some of them developed good contact 
with those people in the OR shop who have 
had actual operational experience, and that's a 
valuable interchange, but without that, some-
times there is overspecialization, and journal 
editors become overly academic, and show lit-
tle appreciation for a scientific approach. 
I will give an example. In MORS, you men-
tioned, there has been some considerable inter-
est in the so-called new sciences, chaos, com-
plexity, and so on, and my feeling is, as I have 
expressed at MORS meetings, there is too little 
appreciation for the classic scientific method 
itself, as opposed to some theoretical qualities. 
MR. VISCO: Was it more fun in the early 
days than it is now? Do you enjoy it more? 
MR. THOMAS: I think that when one is 
working on a good problem and making 
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r~ogress, that is always fun. I think in the early 
days it may have been easier to find things that 
had not been done at all. 
Today, there is some possibility that one 
will rediscover something that was well known 
20 years ago, but had fallen into disuse or ne-
glect. There are still plenty of unsolved prob-
lems, like discovering the proper role for tech-
niques like distributed interactive simulation 
DIS, or ADS, advanced distributed sirnulahon. 
That is still a challenge, and learning more 
about how people perform in combat as com-
pared with performance not in combat is still 
supremely challenging. 
MR. VISCO: There is one last question, 
and that is, what would be the most important 
advice you could give to someone just starting 
out in military operations research today? 
MR. THOMAS: My advice would be ask 
yourself if you really have a passion, if you 
really get excited by applying a scientific 
method, quantitative methods, in areas where 
they had previously not been much used, and if 
you do have that passion, that excitement, then, 
by all means consider a career in operations 
research. If you are not excited by it, I would 
say you might be more interested in some spe-
cial discipline, maybe computer programming 
or some academic discipline. 
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